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The Shape of the World:
What if Aesthetic Properties Were Real?
Crispin Sartwell
abstract  Perhaps we should entertain the idea that aesthetic properties are 
no less (but no more) objective than properties like weight or shape. Indeed, 
the weight and shape of something are themselves aesthetic properties of that 
thing. And we might speculate or (what the heck) assert that aesthetic prop-
erties are no more (but no less) socially constructed than size or material com-
position, for example. Indeed the size and material composition of something 
are aesthetic properties of it. We might, that is, live in an aesthetic universe, live 
embedded in an aesthetic reality. Then, for example, to give a full description 
of any thing or phenomenon, we would have to resort to aesthetic categories: 
perhaps there is no natural science, for example, without aesthetics, and vice 
versa. On a good day, the universe might really, actually, truly be beautiful.
keywords Aesthetic properties, universe, materialism, materiality of art
So here is how to think about the universe. It is sort of a fabric; or, bet-
ter, a skein, or perhaps a tangle, snag, snarl, mesh, mess of rough twine, 
tied back on itself in many knots of many kinds. It is a network or grid 
of knots, we might say, but the arrangement is not fully comprehensibly 
ordered. As interpreted from within our cognitive limitations, it is cha-
otic rather than Cartesian.
I am going to use “skein” as a quasi-technical term expressing the mid-
point between a sheer mess or pile of tangled, knotted string and a Carte-
sian grid. The world consists of many strings or ultimately a single string 
tied together or back on itself, forming something that looks like a fabric 
at a distance, consisting of myriads of knots closer up. Each knot is “an 
individual” – a person, tree, refrigerator, county. Each knot has a distinct 
form and location and physical composition (that is, the [token] portion 
of material in which it consists is different from that of any other). But it 
is itself absolutely nothing but a set of relations to other portions of the 
skein: it consists without remainder of string in connection. Different 
points of view on the skein produce different impressions, so that at a 
wider angle larger structures emerge: clusters of knots, etc. But neverthe-
less the skein itself does not depend on any point of view, cultural prac-
tice, interpretation, description, though groups of people operating in a 
practice are themselves a knot of knots in connection or conversation.
Emerson says: “A man is a bundle of relations, a knot of roots, whose 
flower and fruitage is the world. His faculties refer to natures out of 
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him.”1 It is true that “the fabric of reality” is an old saw or the merest 
cliché; you keep running into it in everything from Confucius to the 
Greeks to the latest popularization of string theory or what I am call-
ing knot theory: the theory of entanglements: universe as macramé or 
crochet. From one point of view, the fact that I am harping on a cliché 
is a drawback. From another, it suggests that I have latched on to some 
fundamental insight. 
With regard to the science or everyday experience of the knotscape, 
we might say that you could pick out indefinitely many structures or 
introduce various ontological ordering principles for various purposes: 
taxonomies of knots, identifications of sub-knot elements to show the 
structure of particular knots (precisely the function of skein analysis in 
knot theory). But for a given claim to be true – for us to say something 
true about the universe – entails that the skein actually has the structure 
attributed to it. In some sense, what counts as a knot has to be fixed and 
is a question: “is that tangle a single knot or a stack of knots or not a knot 
at all?”, which is always dependent on a particular standpoint that is be-
ing taken up, or the rough ontology.
The way we order the array into individuals, however, is not whimsi-
cal or merely conventional. Indeed, if we did not order our experience of 
the world more or less the way the world actually is, we would long ago 
have been extinguished. We order the world from within the world, as 
part of the world. If we did not distinguish lions from various portions of 
its environment, we would merely be prey for something in turn able to 
distinguish us. Nevertheless, of course, the body of the lion or the human 
being is not fully distinct from its surround, and as the lion is breathing, 
seeing, smelling, eating, excreting, growing, aging, it is in interchange. 
We are actual creatures functioning in an actual environment; we are of 
necessity continuously responsive to actual features of it in their emerg-
ence through us. We have to “mirror” reality, we might say, but I see 
attention and perception as much more intimate than that: as an actual 
taking-in of external objects: perception is ingestion.
Like many people, I at once use or even glorify the term “nature” and 
suspect it of harboring the entire environmental problem, wrapped up 
like a seed. But if “nature” means anything, then it means the whole of 
the skein, whatever in turn that might mean: the skein as it really is 
under all dimensions of experience and analysis, in all its relations. So 
what are these dimensions? If I were trying to issue a description of the 
skein where would I begin? If I were trying to issue an ideally replete or 
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full description, what would I have to include? And I am of course again 
speaking from within the world – I am included in what I am describing 
– and my speaking in it of it itself is a deformation of or a tug on it, a 
material event.
If I said, for example, that this skein or tangle displayed aesthetic prop-
erties such as (for example) beauty, what would I be saying? Or I might 
point or mark out certain passages, knotscapes as it were. Maybe I like it 
when they fall into a regular or predictable repeating pattern; or maybe 
I like fantastic concatenations of string. Maybe I reach up and make ad-
justments, in illustration of some point, or just as a matter of more or less 
arbitrary preference. So if I was trying to give a description of the skein, 
I might resort to aesthetic qualities as holistic sensible qualities of par-
ticulars, regions, or the skein as a whole. As significantly, aesthetic values 
may be guides for interventions in the knotscape: ways of tying, etc. 
If I said of any such thing or array that it was “beautiful,” you could 
take this to denote approval, but typically there is also more that I could 
say, and there is certainly more that I could say if I am a professional: 
about in virtue of what qualities it is beautiful: about what makes the 
pebble or the painting or interstellar space beautiful. Well, essentially 
we are in this position with regard to all qualities; they are qualities, as it 
were, of the ontological object that consists of a culturally embedded per-
ceiver/speaker/body in juxtaposition with the thing being experienced 
or described, suspended in juxtaposition in an atmosphere or tangle of 
air and light and language.
There are – let us say: provisionally or apparently – three salient mo-
ments or zones or aspects of the act of asserting of something that it is 
beautiful. There is the object as it exists outside the interpreter (let us 
suppose) in space (let us suppose). There is the perceiver of whatever 
sort. And there is a set of vocabularies and, more widely, social practices 
that have to do with beauty. Another language might have another word 
with a different inflection, and of course other peoples or people might 
have different “standards” of taste in whatever dimension, perhaps an 
elaborate system within a system of elaborate systems different from 
one’s own. Now I start by distinguishing these three dimensions or as-
pects – the objective, the subjective, and the social – because that reflects 
our way of scientifically, social-scientifically, philosophically accounting 
for these things. But the idea that “physical reality,” “social practices,” and 
“subjectivities” can actually be distinguished in a principled way is the 
very notion I want to destroy. 
Twentieth century philosophy took it upon itself to collapse the dis-
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tinction between the individual and the social: you see this in the work, 
for example, of Mead, Wittgenstein, or Foucault. And you saw it in 
Rousseau, Hegel, German nationalism, and Marx, for example. Now, I 
think that this collapse took a distorted form; it just reduced the indi-
vidual to the social, whereas the collapse should have been mutual and 
simultaneous. But at any rate, having collapsed the social/individual 
distinction, we should proceed to destroy the distinctions between 
the material surround – that is, nature, the objective – and the social, 
and between nature and the individual. Bruno Latour’s work should 
be exemplary here, and his view that each object which sociologists 
could study is a “lash-up” of (what have been considered) social, indi-
vidual, and material factors, finally motivates a desire to completely 
forego/destroy all the concepts involved, particularly “nature” and “the 
social.”2 “The social” is a version of what is also called “the artificial,” 
the fabricated or man-made, and of course “the artificial” is the proper 
complement to nature, so that finally the term “nature” only registers 
our own apartness from the world; nature is itself an artifact of this 
artifice, “nature.” This is why I say the whole environmental problem is 
wrapped up in the concept. Whether nature is the garden from which 
we have fallen, or the merely material over which we as spirits have 
dominion, the human and the rest of the material world are bifurcated 
in a false but potentially conceptually fatal way. In particular, the social 
is opposed to the merely or the rawly material; “social” explanations 
of race, gender, and so on, resist precisely the naturalization of various 
socially-determined vocabularies or taxonomies.
At any rate, if I use the term “nature,” and I may, I intend to pick out 
absolutely everything, including everything we are as human beings and 
everything we have made and every intervention we have performed in 
reality. Really, we have no idea what the universe would be without us 
in it or with only us in it. Of course, this idea of talking about the whole 
or the one without the other may be nonsense, and is itself apparently 
outside the set of which it is a member. But on the other hand I do not 
think we are going to be able to stop talking about the whole: we are so 
adept at the encompassing abstraction that the ultimate encompassing 
abstraction beckons irresistibly. And among other things, when we talk 
about the whole, or when we order into wholes including individuals, we 
are entering aesthetic territory. 
Latour argues that we have to replace the social in the surround of 
the physical: there are no people, practices, institutions, conventions, 
truths without non-human things. The social is entirely embedded 
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in “the material,” “nature,” the non- or less-than or more-than human. 
Without physical objects, he points out, “the social” is an entirely inert 
mysterious powerless essence that does not do or explain anything. I 
associate myself with these remarks.
Now, when we think of the aesthetic properties of an object, we may think 
of its form, or qualities of its form. If form were to be understood, or could 
be thought, apart from matter, then this would indicate that in some sense 
the aesthetic properties of a thing are not, as it were, real properties of 
it; not, for example, “objective” or scientifically ascertainable or studyable 
properties. But on the contrary, the form of something is precisely its ma-
terial arrangement (here I think we are close in some ways to the dispute 
between Plato and Aristotle on “form.”). The Parthenon, we might say, is 
that very material under that very configuration. At each actual site, form 
and material are identical. Every actual object is a site at which matter and 
form coincide: they coincide at that site, and neither ever appears indepen-
dently at any site, that is, in any object. Skein analysis describes possible 
knot configurations in an “abstract” way; but the description is a concrete 
set of inscriptions or image-tokens, and the knot is made of string.
If we believe that, at a minimum, to describe the form of something 
is to describe that very thing, which is a material object, then insofar as 
the aesthetic aspects are the formal aspects, the aesthetic aspects are ger-
mane and material. So for example, of the skein, the question whether it 
is as a whole well or comprehensibly ordered: is that a scientific question 
or an aesthetic question? Well, I think that is precisely the sort of thing 
you hope to find out, detect, or even adore in the practice of science. What 
would it mean for a system to be well-ordered? Various dimensions of 
fact-value suggest themselves; one is surely aesthetics. We might say that 
the epistemic standards of science are aesthetic through and through, 
that the practice demands a standard of rationality that we might call an 
aspiration to or a reflection of an experience of beauty, its trace.
For example, we might think of an ordering principle like Ockham’s ra-
zor: a nice way to cut cognitive costs, or maybe not, but above all a standard 
of beauty in explanation. Indeed the standard is identical to Hutcheson’s: 
the compound ratio of variety to uniformity: individuals comprehended 
under the single category in taxonomy. Ockham’s razor gave us both mate-
rialism and idealism, opposed to the death, auf hebunged in Hegel and so 
on, but both committed to the ultimate singleness of the universe, the co-
herence of all in a single ontological plane. That is, though the materialists 
and idealists of the modern period disagreed about ontology, they agreed 
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about aesthetics, and that is precisely why even Berkeley at times threw 
up his hands and said the dispute was verbal: as long as you give me 
these things – this world, ordered under this aesthetic – I do not really 
care whether you call them material or mental. He certainly believed that 
once one no longer believed in the material world, one would just keep 
doing science the same way as always: an extraordinary idea considering 
the usual association of science with materialism throughout the nine-
teenth century.
Consider a shadow as an object. It is best conceived as a situation, or an 
aspect, feature, portion of a situation. We might say that the shadow is 
caused by the light source, object, etc., but in truth it is a mercurial chunk 
of that situation: the shadow is not called into being by the light, etc.: it is 
the light in its flow, implicating an environment and certain sorts of sen-
sory apparatus. The “modern” account of human consciousness as a “sen-
sorium” or an arena of “ideas” conceived primarily as mental images – the 
basic notion underlying both “rationalism” and “empiricism” – reifies the 
shadow, isolates it, severs its connections, or actually deletes the situation 
that makes it possible and the material of which it consists. 
We ought to think of human perception as a penetration of the body 
by the world: a strand going in and helping to compose the knot, and 
then emerging again and on to the next. When I see something, light lit-
erally enters my body and works its way through it in a series of transfor-
mations: my act of perception encompasses an external-world situation, 
or is itself an external/internal world situation. My body/my conscious-
ness is composed of stuff appropriated from the environment; it is not 
distinct from the environment in any sense. My consciousness is a trace 
or shadow in, or better, a knot of, a physical reality.
The same is true of the social both ways round. So first of all, all 
these individual events/situations of perception are parts of the social. 
My consciousness is a portion of the social as a knot is part of a larger 
section of skein, or indefinitely many larger sections. But social vocabu-
laries, narratives, descriptions, and so on, are massively constrained by 
a physical universe. That social systems in some sense emerge from 
physical environments is a commonplace, though no doubt contro-
versial in the sense that a linguistic idealist such as Rorty would not 
even give me the term “physical environment” or would regard it as 
an artifact of social practices, language games, and the like. Well, it is 
an artifact of social practice, but no more than social practices are arti-
facts of it. Again Latour’s work is exemplary here, and he shows minute 
The Shape of the World: What if Aesthetic Properties Were Real?
29
by minute, detail by detail, how social practices are continuously em-
bedded and re-embedded in physical objects, as they transform those 
objects according to their recalcitrances, are transformed by those ob-
jects according to our own recalcitrances, and so on.
Truth, we might say provisionally, is a snarl of such portions or aspects, 
their mutual compromise or annihilation into each other. So “the tree is 
beautiful” implicates the social in, for example, a romantic celebration 
of nature (behind it lurks Muir or Thoreau or Wordsworth etc: a whole 
history and vocabulary of appreciation characteristic of big swathes of 
culture). It implicates the social for that matter, in that “beautiful” is a 
word and there are no private languages. “Tree” is a word too, believe it 
or not. That it picks out what it does and fails to pick out what it does 
not is not any individual’s decision. Perhaps it implicates the social in 
that, in emitting the utterance, I am trying to do something with you or 
to you: impress you, agree with you, attack you, distract you. Of course, 
“the tree is beautiful” notoriously implicates the individual in her sub-
jectivity; in fact, some thinkers make it merely a trace or expression of 
a supposedly purely subjective experience, a variety of pleasure for ex-
ample. This, as even its advocates such as Santayana have seen, appears 
to make sentences like “The tree is beautiful” sheer mistakes, since it is 
on this account not about a tree at all. But at any rate, entirely delete the 
“individual” or “subjective” dimension of the experience and it is sense-
less to talk about beauty. But I also insist on this – and here I call on the 
shades of Muir, Thoreau, and Wordsworth to testify – when I say “the 
tree is beautiful,” I am talking about the tree, not about myself. “The tree 
is beautiful” does not mean “I feel funny.” 
As to the relation of the physical to the social, we deal with things 
and materials themselves with regard to culturally circulating mean-
ings, while the physical features of things and materials massively shape 
those very meanings. For example, the stone slabs that form the floor and 
counter of an old-fashioned small-town bank convey stability and quiet 
wealth. But the stone is fitted in virtue of its physical features to express 
such things; its semiotics is not a mere stipulation; it was selected for 
the task in virtue of the fact that it was physically suited to convey such 
meanings. Stone is more stable, enduring, and heavy than bakelite or 
linoleum, for example. If we think of the stone in its physical qualities, 
however, we cannot detach those from the social entirely. The stone has 
to be inexpensive enough to be budgetable when bakelite is available. 
But then the cost of the stone depends on a myriad of social factors, in-
cluding the activities of the central bankers, for example. 
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The stone has to be workable, which depends on the tools and skills 
at our disposal. But the way that this particular kind of stone enters 
the market and gets worked – the social uses of stone – has a myriad 
of physical aspects: how common the stone is on earth, how accessible 
the quarries are to the bank’s location, and then what transportation 
resources we have, what materials we have available to make the tools 
needed to work the stone, and so on and on. And someone had to make 
the decision to install, someone who had mastered the semiotics of 
stone and also had some handle on the material juxtapositions that 
would make it possible to install it. Someone designed the installation. 
You cannot explain anything – including the aesthetic qualities of the 
stone or bank – by the merely social. You cannot explain them by the 
merely material. You cannot explain them as merely personal. The 
meaning and the physical quality of the installed stone is an incredibly 
elaborate concatenation or lash-up of factors.
Meaning is neither only out there among things themselves nor only in 
the head or the language, but is an interaction of persons and environ-
ments, physical or virtual, stone or televised image. The attribution of 
an aesthetic feature to a thing involves a language and a culture and an 
experiencer, but if it is true, it picks out a real feature of that thing in 
its context. Attributions of aesthetic properties to things are not merely 
objective, not merely subjective, and not merely culturally fixed: the aes-
thetic features of a thing are features of it in a situation, which implicates 
all of these, in every case. We might allow this to show us that the distinc-
tions between the personal, the social, and the material simply cannot be 
maintained. It is skein all the way across.
A building or a city section might resolve roughly into a triangle, be 
symmetrical or balanced; it might have been made of local stone, or con-
crete and steel, or whatever can be salvaged from the local dump. And it 
will have what we might think of as art-historical properties, which are 
also underlain by formal properties and other design features (but also 
by the character of materials, gravity, transportation, economics, etc.). 
For example, stylistic properties: Gothic, Classical, Baroque, Rococo, Neo-
classical, Modernist, eclectic. It may be bold or timid, traditional or inno-
vative, inspiring or depressing. I intend to use all of these terms to pick 
out aesthetic features, at least on some occasions of their use. And to an 
aesthetic experience or judgment of a facade as Gothic, for example, the 
actual date at which it was built, information about the design process 
and the people who participated in it, and its location are as relevant as 
The Shape of the World: What if Aesthetic Properties Were Real?
31
the shape of the windows. Notice that, though we might refer to a con-
temporary building made of glass and steel as “Gothic,” we might also 
refer to it as “pseudo-gothic” or “contemporary gothic” and so on, terms 
for aesthetic features that no fourteenth-century building could display. 
That is, a thing’s various relations or relational properties – its histories 
and historically emergent properties – are potentially aesthetic features 
of it, depending on the purpose and context of interpretation.
Again, in my view, aesthetic features of an object – its shape, let us say, 
and the ways that shape means within a culture – are no more subjective 
than any other qualities of an object, for example its weight; indeed it is 
not hard to imagine cases where weight itself is an aesthetic feature of 
an object. People can be simply wrong about the aesthetic features of an 
object: aesthetic features become evident in interpretations of an object, 
but these interpretations are called forth and constrained massively by 
the character of the object, its origin, its material, as well as by real and 
recalcitrant features of the culture from which it emerges and the dis-
courses in which it appears. 
That is, attributions of beauty are true only under conditions which 
implicate “the natural,” “the linguistic,” and “the subjective” in every case. 
What makes truth possible in this sense is that these aspects are not in-
sular, but strands of the skein all snarled up together. If we said beauty is 
in the eye of the beholder as opposed to being in the objective world, we 
would be entirely confused. The eye of the beholder is itself in the objec-
tive world. If you do not believe me, pluck out your left eye and look at 
it. There it is! This is true of your “mental images,” true of every aspect 
of human consciousness. In fact, the characteristic derangements of hu-
man consciousness derive from losing or severing some of these strands: 
someone tried to cut off the psychotic’s knot. 
I am moving with apparent insouciance between aesthetic objects, 
experiences, and truths, and objects, experiences and truths quite in 
general. That is not mere confusion. That a couch weighs 150 pounds 
is a fact about the couch; to know what it means, you would have to 
know what a pound is, more or less, and understand a decimal nota-
tion. That a pound or kilogram is a standard measure of weight has 
to do with environmental/physical features such as gravity, as well as 
with the evolution of the human body and the histories of the cultures 
where the measures arose – the mechanisms or practices, for example, 
by which measurements are standardized and disseminated. If we had 
been a thousand seventeen times as strong as we are, we would have 
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a completely different system. But that does not make the weight of 
things subjective or a mere cultural construction, and it does not make 
an assertion about the weight of something an assertion about our lan-
guage. The aesthetic features of a situation are potentially as external 
to us and to our practices and as epistemically available as any other 
aspects of the world, though there are special problems of subtlety or 
ambiguity in the case of ascriptions of some aesthetic features: notori-
ously, “beauty.” Well, there are special problems in a lot of areas: think 
about how complex a matter it might be in a vexed case to show that 
a particular economic system is capitalist or socialist, or a particular 
color blue or green, for example. Depending on the circumstances, it 
can be hard or impossible to weigh something; depending on the in-
struments, you might get imprecise or inaccurate results, and so on.
Now, I am not sure what to do with properties in general in ontol-
ogy, but allowing them in and for them to function non-problematically 
for a moment, we could also try to treat them according to the skein or 
snarl idea. So for example, I suggested that under certain circumstances, 
weight is an aesthetic property. That is one of the reasons building in 
stone is interesting or important, or the fact that a structure is made of 
stone is an aesthetic aspect of it. The weight of the pyramids, or the sheer 
fact that relative to the human body they are immensely heavy, is at once 
a physical/external, a political, and an aesthetic feature of the pyramids 
(politically, we might say, the weight is an expression of the immense 
strength of the Pharaoh, or his immense ability to annex the strength of 
others; cf. the Pentagon). Well every physical object has weight (I think!), 
so it follows that every thing that exists has an aesthetic property, or has 
properties that in the right circumstances/juxtapositions/connections 
can be considered aesthetic. Weight is chosen almost at random here, 
and in this way of thinking about it, in connection to certain lash-ups, 
every object has a myriad of aesthetic properties. These properties are 
as objective and as non-objective as any other real properties: they are 
as objective and as non-objective as weight, for example. The aesthetic is 
lashed to the weight properties, color properties, size properties, shape 
properties, and with the ways all of these interact with each other and 
with an entire physical/social/individual world.
Now, you might think that, for example, aesthetic features like beauty 
have no actual physical effects, or have such effects only in relation to 
perceivers. Of course, when I see Lauren Bacall or her image on the 
screen and think she is beautiful, this does have physical effects: I re-
orient my body, stare, blood rushes here and there, neurons fire, etc. But 
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that is because of my experience of the image; these things are happen-
ing in a conscious experiencer experiencing this image. But if weight is 
an aesthetic property, then subjectivity is not required for an object to 
display an aesthetic property. If you dropped a pyramid on me, it would 
smash me flat as a pancake, and not because I was interpreting it in a 
certain way. Yet it would not crush me if I did not exist as a body of a 
certain kind. If my body was of another kind, maybe I could catch the 
pyramid and toss it back, or brush it off like a fly: different “subjects” 
have different responses. 
So, let us entertain this idea: aesthetic properties are exactly as objective 
as any other properties, which is to say that they are features of a situation 
implicating many levels of “being”: again, a physical object in a physical 
context, a set of social practices, a set of personal experiences. Delete the 
personal experience and you have deleted the beauty, not because beauty 
is subjective, but because subjectivity is one strand in this knot; when this 
strand is disentangled it ceases to be the particular knot that it is.
Perhaps after all this I had better say something about environmental 
aesthetics. First of all, the approach I am suggesting means that environ-
mental aesthetics ought to be considered epistemically legitimate: it is 
engaged in discerning the real qualities of real things. Indeed, the reality 
of things is at the heart of one’s respect for them; to say they are real is 
to acknowledge them. That is, to exist is to count one way and another: 
ontologically, epistemically, morally, aesthetically. And then the question 
is, in any particular case, how and how much? So values are in play in 
ontology from the outset, and in this case, of course, we cannot fail to 
broach questions of aesthetic value in particular.
But of course the approach I’m suggesting also issues some cautions. 
We are not some outside force pouring artificial materials into a natural 
atmosphere, hence damaging it; we are creatures doing what we do with 
and as the materials we find around us. I am not sure we could even 
make sense of the idea of “damage” without having at least two agen-
cies, or an agency in juxtaposition with an object. But if we are hurting 
nature, of course this is nature hurting itself. Our “destruction of nature” 
is its own self-destruction, though I do not think that “destruction” is ulti-
mately going to make sense here. And then a question might be: how if 
at all would such an insight – if it is an insight – change our practice with 
regard to particular environments or environmental issues?
That might be the question that would most interest you. I cannot 
really try to deal with it in any full-fledged way here or perhaps any-
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where. But I do want to suggest that a complete acknowledgment of our 
complete inherence in the natural world would indeed change some 
of our practices. We have to start with an insistence on acceptance or 
affirmation – this world, exactly as it is with us in it, is the world. We 
have to try actually to experience our connections, in detail, an experi-
ence that has withdrawn under the pressure of a bad metaphysics or a 
wrong self-image – self-congratulatory or self-loathing – of the social, 
artificial, human, as a different order or position within the whole. And 
one thing I am saying is that withdrawing our grandiosity about our-
selves as either masters or stewards of nature, as its users, destroyers, 
preservers, does not require us to stop deploying values or trying to act 
in accordance with them.
We had better think about what the aesthetic properties of this eco-
system, network, skein, web, fabric, really are. For one thing it is not a 
steady state or really even cyclical system, though it displays all kinds 
of epicycles or loops; it is a volatile system. It is explosive: more like a 
Caravaggio than a Raphael. This is true of global temperatures, of course, 
and we are just one of many factors that have cooled or heated the atmo-
sphere of this earth. This is, I am afraid, a reality to which we are going to 
have to reconcile ourselves, but it is an aesthetic reality among its other 
dimensions. We can no more produce a steady (“sustainable”) state than 
we can detect one already out there, or detect an equilibrium or balance 
that we are disturbing. There is in nature exactly as much equilibrium 
as there actually is, with us in it. We are not dealing with an invariant or 
cyclical nature but a tangle in time, tangled time. We are in a situation/
juxtaposition/collection of ourselves and everything that is not us. It/us 
is in the process of shifting: growing or shrinking, heating up or cooling 
down, bringing up the volume or turning it down.
We have to understand the human effect of nature, in other words, as 
nature’s effect on itself: of course, what else could it be if you have any 
tendency toward naturalism? The idea that we are called upon to save or 
redeem the earth is exactly as committed to an ontology of supernatural 
beings (namely, the people who endorse the idea) as is the idea that we 
are the masters of the world and can legitimately, for example, use mem-
bers of other species however we see fit. 
Even within the wacky pluralism and mere metaphor of which I have 
availed myself so far, I want to say that I remain committed to some 
sort of basic materialism; we have got to try to hold on to the material-
ity of an aesthetic experience in a forest or in a museum: we need to 
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hold on to particular bodies and objects: that is part of what it would 
mean to love the world or for the world to be beautiful. Materiality is 
what makes the world funky, what makes it external to ourselves, but 
also what makes ourselves part of it.
Thoreau writes: “What is it to be admitted to a museum, to see a 
myriad of particular things, compared with being shown some star’s 
surface, some hard matter in its home! I stand in awe of my body, this 
matter to which I am bound has become so strange to me […] Think of 
our life in nature, – daily to be shown matter, to come in contact with 
it, – rocks, trees, wind on our cheeks! the solid earth! the actual world! 
Contact! Contact! Who are we? where are we?”3 I think matter is mys-
terious and more or less adorable. Or it is a bitch, really, but I would not 
do aesthetics without it, not when every artistic process is a transform-
ation of materials by person and person by materials. 
In other words, to begin with, art has to be conceived in terms of hu-
man/nonhuman assemblages: conceptual art is all very nice, but there 
really is no private art any more than there is a private language, and 
the work of art is a development in materials, an array of “facts”: hu-
man/nonhuman material assemblages or skein regions; acts of com-
munication among people and things. All art is environmental art in 
the sense that it all consists of processes within ecosystems, as well as 
reflecting objects, expressing emotions, and so on: art is above all a ma-
terial intervention. This is rather a precious thing to say about a Bran-
cusi sculpture, perhaps (but perhaps not), but it is not at all precious 
with regard to the design of a city or an approach to land use. Both of 
these, of course, are of necessity engagements in aesthetic value as well 
as other values; they are sites at which dimensions or arrays of values 
converge or are actualized materially. Even to make land-use policies 
or to design buildings in the complete absence of a desire for beauty 
or a rejection of it – as in the architecture of Marxist dictatorships – is 
to manifest aesthetic commitments and to have real aesthetic-material 
results: really to change the shape of things.
Well, then we need to think about the values we deploy in trans-
forming the world, and here the approach that I am suggesting is com-
patible in many ways with the tradition of environmentalism. But even 
acts of imagination and government policies are material transform-
ations. Many values are in play, or they all are, and they themselves 
have to be conceived as inherent in the world. For example: do we 
want to live in an entirely humanized or technological environment? 
Or maybe out in the woods with Thoreau? Well neither of these is more 
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natural or more material or more socially articulated than the other. 
And among other things we ought to think about the dimensions of 
beauty that open up to experience in each such context. Then we may 
choose. But the transformations are not merely personal; they are al-
ways a participation in, an alteration of, the whole.
So I am giving a plea for the materialization of art, and hence for the 
continuity of art with reality, the understanding of human making as 
an upwelling within nature, a series of natural transformations, tanta-
mount to erosion or vegetation. On the other hand, the aesthetic dimen-
sion of nature – perhaps opened up within nature by human making, 
perhaps not – is factual: something we detect, a series of juxtapositions 
within the reality in which we and our artifacts and our world, in our 
entirety and theirs and its, are entangled. 
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